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thus spelling out what we may assume that the 1951 legislature actually
intended to provide.
JoHN B. SHOLLEY
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Family Desertion-Non-support. Chapter 255 amends RCW 26.20.030 [Rem. Supp. 1943 § 69081 by changing the penalties for desertion
where children under the age of sixteen are involved. The former section
made this a felony, carrying with it imprisonment in the state prison
up to twenty years, or in the county jail up to one year, or a fine of not
more than one thousand dollars, or both such fine and imprisonment.
There is substituted a graduated series of penalties: for the first offense,
county jail up to thirty days, or fine up to one hundred dollars, or both,
for the second offense, county jail for not less than thirty nor more than
ninety days, or a fine up to three hundred dollars, or both; for a third
offense, the same penalties as under the old section.
The problem of the deserting father is a real one, as any social
worker can testify; fecundity and irresponsibility so often go hand-inhand that the deserted mother and her brood represent a perennial
drain upon relief funds. While it is likely that the act of desertion is
beyond the reach of statute m a preventive sense, nevertheless the
amendment here presented has real value. Assuming that the recalcitrant father can be brought to book (a rather rare circumstance in
view of the limited funds available to prosecutors), under the old
system he was brought before a justice of the peace who under threat
of binding him over to the Superior Court for a felony trial secured a
promise that the offender would contribute so much a week for the
support of the family The amendment puts the offense within the
jurisdiction of the justice court; he may speedily try, convict, and
suspend sentence on condition that the offender contribute. This puts
the matter on the proper judicial level, avoiding the delay and the added
expense of the felony trial, whether the amendment will bring in more
support is speculative, but it at least has the advantage to the lawyer
of being legal.
JoHN W RICHARDS
EVIDENCE
The Uniform Photographic Copies of Business and Public Records
as Evidence Act. Chapter 273 is the final step taken by the legislature
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to free the business man, the lawyer, and the courts from the archaic
absurdities of the common law rules of evidence relating to the proof
of business and public records. The first step was the Uniform Business
Records as Evidence Act in 1947.1 Further freedom was achieved when
a 1949 act2 authorized business and public records to be recorded or
reproduced by the photographic process and permitted the photographic reproduction to be used as "original" evidence for all purposes.
Progress is complete with this chapter. To the wide coverage of the
Uniform Business Records Act is added all departments and agencies
of government. Any record or memorandum of any kind recorded in
the regular course of business which has, in the regular course of business, been "recorded, copied or reproduced by any photographic,

photostatic, microfilm, microcard, miniature photograph or other process which accurately reproduces or forms a durable medium for so
reproducing the original" may be proved by introducing the photographic copy, which is "as admissible in evidence as the original itself"
when satisfactorily identified. Specific authority is given for the destruction of the original in the regular course of business without
affecting the admissibility of the photographic copy. Thus the Regular
Entries in Course of Business and Best Evidence rules are brought at
last to bay. The only remnant of the latter rule apparent in the statute
is the provision admitting into evidence a facsimile or enlargement of
the photographic reproduction "if the original reproduction is in existence and available for inspection under direction of the court." Presumably it would be the rare case in which such inspection would be
required; if it were, it is certainly much simpler to qualify the photograph than the original document. Even the worst imaginable situation
-the original document destroyed after microfilming, an enlargement
of the microfilm prepared for use on trial, and then the original microfilm destroyed by accidental fire-is simplified under the Act. Now the
Best Evidence Rule operates, but the microfilm is the original, its
unavailability can be easily shown, and there can be no difficulty in
admitting the existing enlargement as secondary evidence.
The Act will be of immense importance when it is truly uniform, since
so much interstate business is carried on by large firms whose records
are kept at the main office. Some twenty-five states have adopted the
1 RCW
2RCW

5.44.100 [Rmx. Supp. 1947 § 1263-1].
4020.020 [Rmr. Supp. 1949 § 1257-4].
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Act; it is to be hoped that its acceptance will soon be as universal as
that of the N.I.L.
JOHN W RICHARDS

PROPERTY
Alien Land Law. Chapters 9, 10 and 11 of the session laws are
amendments or additions to the Alien Land Law' Chapter 9 adds a
new section expressly granting the right to own or lease land in Washington to Canadian citizens of provinces which do not prohibit ownership of land therein by Washington citizens, and to corporations
"organized under the laws of this or any other state" directly or
indirectly owned by such Canadians. Chapter 10 adds a proviso to
section 1 of the Alien Land Law withdrawing certain corporations from
the definition of "alien" by, apparently, establishing that the corporate
veil will be "pierced" only once to determine whether alien persons
are the real owners. This chapter also includes a severability clause and
a section 3 which repeals the section 2 of the corporation law complementary to the Alien Land Law 2 Chapter 11 adds a sentence to assure
that exchange of stock of an "eligible" corporation for land transferred
by an "alien" corporation shall support a conclusion that the conveyance is in good faith and for value. It is complementary to Chapter 10.
It is this reviewer's recollection that newspaper accounts indicated
Chapter 9, which might be called the Canadian amendment, was motivated by expressions in Canada that if Washington could not permit
citizens of the provinces north of the state to own land in the State
there might well be comparable restrictions running the other way;
and that Chapter 10 was believed to be necessary to assure location of
certain major corporate enterprises in Washington.
The immediate purposes of the sponsors of these changes probably
has been accomplished, but the combination of these changes, decisions
such as in the Sei Fujii and Kenji Namba cases, the federal constitution, and the McCarran-Walter act' changing the naturalization laws,
as a practical matter makes the Alien Land Law essentially a dead
letter. At the time of the California and Oregon decisions, under the
federal law Japanese still could not qualify to become naturalized
1 RCW 64.16.
2 RCW 23.08.110 [RRS § 3836-16].
a See Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
4 Kenji Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949).
5 IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT,

(1953 Supp.).
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